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FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT-WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMU-
NITY-The United States Supreme Court held that the Federal
Tort Claims Act's exception to its waiver of sovereign immunity
for claims arising in a "foreign country" includes claims arising on
the continent of Antarctica.
Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1178 (1993).
John Emmett Smith ("decedent"), the spouse of the Petitioner,
Sandra Jean Smith ("Smith" or "Petitioner"), was a carpenter
working at McMurdo Station, Antarctica, for a construction com-
pany under contract with the National Science Foundation
("NSF").1 While taking a recreational hike near McMurdo Station
with two companions, the decedent wandered off the marked path,
fell into a crevasse in the ice and died of exposure.2 Smith brought
a wrongful death action against the United States under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act ("FTCA").
The FTCA provides for a waiver of the federal government's
sovereign immunity for tortious acts or omissions committed by
the United States." The FTCA also grants the United States dis-
trict courts exclusive jurisdiction over tort suits against the United
States.5 However, the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity is not
1. Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1178 (1993). The National Science Foundation
("NSF") is an agency of the United States and its employees are considered federal employ-
ees for the purposes of the Federal Tort Claims Act. Smith v. United States, 702 F. Supp.
1480, 1483 (D. Or. 1989). The decedent was employed by ITT Antarctic Services, which was
under contract to provide construction services to the NSF in Antarctica. Smith, 702 F.
Supp. at 1483.
2. Id. at 1484. During the initial part of the hike the party followed a route that had
been flagged, but later departed from the flagged route. Id. After deviating from the flagged
route, the decedent and his companions encountered an obvious crevasse, and at another
point in the walk two members of the party sank into snow above their knees. Id. The party
continued on until the decedent and another member of the party suddenly disappeared
from sight when they fell into a crevasse. Id. The decedent died as a result of injuries sus-
tained from the fall and exposure. Id.
3. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1180. The FTCA is comprised of the following sections of
title 28 of the U.S. Code: 1346(b), 1402(b), 2401(b), and 2671-2680. Each section is discussed
below.
4. Section 2674 of the FTCA provides that: "[tlhe United States shall be liable, re-
specting the provisions of this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the
same extent as a private individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for
interest prior to judgement or for punitive damages." 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1989).
5. Section 1346 of the FTCA provides that:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title the district courts, together
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absolute, as the FTCA does not apply to a number of situations
including claims arising in a foreign country.' The district court
dismissed the suit on the grounds that the court lacked subject
with the United States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone and the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions
on claims against the United Sttes, for money damages, accruing on or after January
1, 1945, for personal injury or los of property, or personal injury or death caused by
the negligent or wrongful act or mission of any employee of the Government while
acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the
United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a) (Supp. 1993) and (b) (1976).
6. Section 2680 of the FTCA limits the application of the FTCA as follows:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b). of this title shall not apply to:
(a) Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government,
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such
statute or regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the fail-
ure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be
abused.
(b) Any claim arising out of the loss, miscarriage, or negligent transmission of letters
or postal matter.
(c) Any claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs
duty, or the detention of any goods or merchandise by any officer of customs or excise
or any other law-enforcement officer.
(d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by sections 741-752, 781-790 of Title
46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States.
(e) Any claim arising out of an act or omission of any employee of the Government in
administering the provisions of sections 1-31 of Title 50, Appendix.
(f) Any claim for damages caused by the imposition or establishment of a quarantine
by the United States.
(g) [Repealed]
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, mali-
cious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or inter-
ference with contract rights: Provided, That, with regard to acts or omissions of in-
vestigative or law enforcement officers of the United States Government, the
provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall apply to any claims
arising, on or after the date of the enactment of this proviso out of assault, battery,
false imprisonment, false arrest, abuse of process, or malicious prosecution. For the
purpose of this subsection, "investigative or law enforcement officer" means any of-
ficer of the United States who is empowered by law to execute searches, to seize evi-
dence, or to make arrests for violations of Federal law.
(i) Any claim for damages caused by the fiscal operations of the Treasury or by the
regulation of the monetary system.
j) Any claim arising out of the combatant activities of the military or naval forces, or
the Coast Guard, during time of war.
(k) Any claim arising in a foreign country.
(1) Any claim arising from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority.
(m) Any claim arising from the activities of the Panama Canal Company.
(n) Any claim arising from the activities of a Federal land bank, a Federal intermedi-
ate credit bank, or a bank for co-operatives.
28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1965 and Supp. 1993).
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matter jurisdiction stating, "[t]his court finds nothing in the FTCA
that would indicate that Congress intended the FTCA to apply to
acts or omissions which arose in. Antarctica."7 The judgment of the
district court was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.'
Upon a grant of certiorari, the ruling of the circuit court was up-
held by the United States Supreme Court.'
The Court10 viewed the controlling issue as, whether under the
FTCA, Antarctica is a foreign country, and treated the question as
one of statutory interpretation. 1 The majority opinion pursued
three primary lines of inquiry to arrive at its decision: (1) an exam-
ination of the language of the FTCA, (2) a review of the legislative
history to discern congressional intent, and (3) reliance on the pre-
sumption against extraterritorial application of United States
statutes. 12
The Petitioner argued that the purpose of the foreign country
exception is to avoid subjecting the government of the United
States to the laws of foreign countries. 13 The Petitioner contended
that the foreign country exception is inapplicable because Antarc-
tica has no civil law and that the conventional choice of law doc-
trine required the application of Oregon law to her claim.14 While
the Court conceded that Antarctica does not have civil law, it
found that excluding Antarctica from the foreign country excep-
tion would be inconsistent with the language of the statute. 5
The majority noted that the FTCA offers no definition of the
term "country" and, therefore, consideration should be given to
the ordinary meaning of the term. The Court noted that the first
definition of country appearing in the dictionary defines the word
as a region or tract of land.'" This definition supported the Court's
7. Smith, 702 F. Supp. at 1481. Smith brought the suit in the District of Oregon, the
district in which Smith resided. Id. at 1482.
8. Smith v. United States, 953 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1991). This decision contained a
dissenting opinion in which Judge Fletcher argued that there was subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Smith, 953 F.2d at 1121.
9. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1178.
10. Id. at 1180. (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by White, Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, Souter, and Thomas, J.J.) Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1181-83.
13. Id. at 1181.
14. Smith, 113 S.Ct. at 1181.
15. Id. at 1180. The Court readily admitted that Antarctica does not have its own
tort law when the Court described the continent as " a sovereignless region without civil tort
law of its own." Id.
16. Id. at 1181 (citing WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 609 (2d ed. 1945)).
1993
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notion that the foreign country exception to the FTCA's waiver of
sovereign immunity applies to Antarctica, regardless of whether
there is a recognized government.17
The language of the FTCA concerning jurisdiction and venue
was also used by the Supreme Court to support its conclusion that
Antarctica was a "country" for the purposes of the Act.18 The
Court pointed out that section 1346(b) contains a choice of law
clause which states that the United States would be liable to the
claimant "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred." 19 However, the Court was of the opinion that
this clause does more than just determine choice of law, it also de-
termines the limits of the jurisdiction conferred by the FTCA.s°
The majority arrived at this conclusion by reasoning "[i]f Antarc-
tica was not a "foreign country," and for that reason included
within the FTCA's coverage, 1346(b) would instruct the courts to
look to the law of a place that has no law in order to determine the
liability of the United States-surely a bizarre result.
'2 1
The venue section of the FTCA was also used by the Court to
support its holding that Antarctica is a "foreign country" for pur-
poses of applying the FTCA.ss Because the FTCA provides venue
in either the location where the claim arose, or the judicial district
where the plaintiff resides, the Court determined that if Antarctica
was not included in the foreign country exception, a situation
could arise where a foreigner injured in Antarctica would be pro-
vided a claim under the FTCA but no venue in which to bring the
claim. 3 The Court concluded that it was unlikely that Congress
would have intended such a result.
24
The Supreme Court looked to its decision in United States v.
17. Id. at 1181.
18. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1181-83.
19. Id. See note 6 for the complete text of § 1346(b) of the FTCA.
20. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1182.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 1182. Section 1402 (b) provides that "claims may be prosecuted only in the
judicial district where the plaintiff resides or where the act or omission complained of oc-
curred." 28 U.S.C. § 1402(2)(b) (1976).
23. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1182.
24. Id. The Court quoted Brunette Machine Works, Ltd. v. Kockum Indus., Inc., 406
U.S. 706, 710 (1972), wherein the Court stated that "Congress does not in general intend to
create venue gaps, which take away with one hand what Congress has given by way of juris-
dictional grant with the other." Brunette Machine Works Ltd., 406 U.S. at 710. Brunette
was a patent infringement suit which addressed the issue of federal venue laws concerning
suits brought against aliens. Id. at 706.
170
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Kubrick26 to support the proposition that since the FTCA is a
waiver of the United States government's sovereign immunity, the
waiver should not be broadly construed.26 According to the Court,
construing the foreign country exception to the FTCA to exclude
claims for torts committed in Antarctica was consistent with
Kubrick.27
Finally, the majority discussed the traditional presumption
against extraterritorial application of United States statutes as
support for its conclusion that suits for torts arising in Antarctica
were barred by the foreign country exception to the FTCA.28 The
Court also relied on United States v. Spelar,29 to support the con-
tention that Congress intended, by the foreign country exception,
to bar suits arising in foreign countries.30 The Court said that Spe-
lar stood for the notion that the language and purpose of the
FTCA clearly barred extraterritorial application of the statute's
waiver of sovereign immunity. 1
Justice Stevens was the sole dissenter to the majority opinion,
and challenged the majority's three main arguments.32 Justice Ste-
vens relied heavily on the historical application of the FTCA, as
well as the language of the statute, to conclude that the FTCA's
foreign country exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity did
25. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
26. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1183. The case of Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 111, was a medical
malpractice action brought against the United States, which interpreted the statute of limi-
tations provision of the FTCA. Id. The Court quoted Kubrick, which stated on the subject
of construing the FTCA: "We should also have in mind that the Act waives the immunity of
the United States and that ... we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the waiver
beyond what Congress intended. Neither, however, should we assume the authority to nar-
row the waiver that Congress has intended." Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1183 (quoting Kubrick,
444 U.S. at 117).
27. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1183.
28. Id. The Court cited the case of EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct.
1227 (1991) to support the proposition that doubts as to the extraterritorial application of
statutes should be resolved in favor of a non-extraterritorial application of the statute. Ara-
bian American Oil Co., 111 S. Ct. at 1230.
29. 338 U.S. 217 (1949). This case was the only case prior to the subject case in which
the United States Supreme Court construed the foreign country exception to the FTCA's
waiver of sovereign immunity. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 217. See notes 84-93 and accompanying
text.
30. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1183.
31. Id. (quoting Spelar, 338 U.S. at 222). In a discussion of the presumption against
extraterritorial application of the FTCA, the Court said, "[tihat presumption, far from be-
ing overcome here, is doubly fortified by the language of this statute and the legislative
purposes underlying it." Id.
32. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1184-89 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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not apply to Antarctica.3 The dissent rejected the majority's broad
construction of the FTCA's foreign country exception to the waiver
of sovereign immunity. " Justice Stevens argued that the proper
construction of the FTCA's foreign country exception applied only
to territories subject to the jurisdiction of a foreign country. 5
The dissent viewed the majority's opinion as restricting the
FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity to the territorial jurisdiction
of the United States.3 6 Objecting to the majority's narrow con-
struction, Justice Stevens argued that the FTCA does not contain
any territorial limit to its coverage.3 7 Justice Stevens contended
that congressional intent for an extraterritorial application of the
Act is evidenced by the fact that section 2680(d) s contains a spe-
cific exclusion for claims brought under the Suits in Admiralty
Act 39 or the Public Vessels Act.' 0 He argued that such an exclusion
would be superfluous unless the FTCA extends to the "sovereig-
nless expanses of the high seas."" While he conceded that evi-
dence of congressional intent to apply the Act's waiver of sovereign
immunity to the high seas did not necessarily mean that it also
applied to Antarctica, he regarded this as sufficient to rebut the
majority's argument that the geographic reach of the FTCA should
be narrowly constructed because of the presumption against extra-




37. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1184 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens wrote, "[t]he
FTCA includes both a broad grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts in section 1346(b)
and a broad waiver of sovereign immunity in section 2674. Neither of these sections identi-
fies any territorial limit on the coverage of the Act." Id. See note 5 for the text of § 1346(b)
and note 6 for the text of § 2680.
38. Section 2680 of the FTCA provides: "The provisions of this chapter and section
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to ... (d) Any claim for which a remedy is provided by
sections 741-752, 781-790 of Title 46, relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the
United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1965 and Supp. 1993).
39. The Suits in Admiralty Act controls the limits of liability and remedies for suits
in admiralty brought by or against vessels or cargoes of the United States. 46 U.S.C. app.
§§ 741-752 (1993).
40. The Public Vessels Act provides procedures, remedies, and limitations on liability
for suits in admiralty against the United States for damages caused by public vessels or for
towage or salvage services. 46 U.S.C. app. §§ 781-790 (1993).
41. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1185 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further sup-
ported this point by citing United States v. Continental Tuna Corp., 425 U.S. 164 (1976),
wherein the Court noted that claims for maritime negligence which could not be brought
under the Suits in Admiralty Act or the Public Vessels Act could be maintained under the
FTCA. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1185 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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territorial application of federal statutes. 2
Justice Stevens characterized the FTCA's waiver of sovereign
immunity as "sweeping" and indicative of congressional intent to
extend the coverage of the FTCA beyond the territorial boundaries
of the United States.43 The dissent stated that in order to give the
statute the broad application that Congress intended, any excep-
tions to the waiver of sovereign immunity should be construed
narrowly.4
The dissenting opinion also rejected the Court's argument that
Antarctica should be included under the FTCA's foreign country
exception because there is no law in Antarctica.45 Justice Stevens
stated that under the doctrine of personal sovereignty, which is
well recognized in American law, the proper law to apply is the law
of the State of Oregon. 6
Justice Stevens was also not swayed by the Court's contention
that the venue provisions of the Act indicate that Congress did not
intend the FTCA to waive sovereign immunity for torts arising in
Antarctica.47 He interpreted Congress' failure to mention Antarc-
tica within the FTCA's foreign country exception as evidence that
Congress simply failed to consider the possibility, and not that
Congress meant to prohibit a cause of action under the FTCA for
torts arising in Antarctica.4"
The doctrine of sovereign immunity has its roots in the common
law of England and simply means that the government is not liable
when acting in its official capacity unless it consents to be sued.4 9
42. Id. at 1185-86.
43. Id. at 1186.
44. Id. Justice Stevens cited United States v. Nordic Village, 112 S. Ct. 1011 (1992),
as support for the proposition that exceptions to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity
should be construed narrowly. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1186. In Nordic Village, the Internal
Revenue Service was sued and prevailed on a defense of sovereign immunity. Nordic Vil-
lage, 112 S. Ct. at 1011. The majority opinion mentioned that the Court had, on occasion,
narrowly construed exceptions to waivers of sovereign immunity where it was consistent
with the clear intent of Congress, such as in the "sweeping" language of the FTCA. Nordic
Village, 112 S. Ct. at 1014.
45. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1187 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
46. Id. The dissent cited American Banana Co. v. United States Fruit Co., 213 U.S.
347 (1909), wherein Justice Holmes said: "[n]o doubt in regions subject to no sovereign, like
the high seas, or to no law that civilized countries would recognize as adequate, such [civi-
lized nations] may treat some relations between their citizens as governed by their own law,
and keep to some extent the old notion of personal sovereignty alive." American Banana
Co., 213 U.S. at 355-56.
47. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1188 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
48. Id. at 1188-89.
49. ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE
1993
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The doctrine is also recognized in the United States.60 Until the
passage of the FTCA in 19461 the only way that an individual
could be compensated for a tort committed by the United States
government was the passage of a private bill by Congress.2  The
FTCA changed this by providing for civil actions for injuries
caused by acts of negligence caused by the United States. 3 How-
ever, the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity was not absolute as
it contained fourteen specific exceptions to the waiver of sovereign
immunity, including "acts arising in foreign countries."' "
An early United States Supreme Court case interpreting the lim-
its to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity was United States
To THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND
OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, V.1 sec. 246 (Rothman Reprints 1969)(1803).
According to Blackstone the essential principle behind sovereign immunity was the notion
that the king could do no wrong and that the doctrine meant two things; one was that
wrongful conduct could not be attributed to the king in the course of his public affairs, nor
was he personally answerable to the people for his conduct. Id. This doctrine was based on
the idea that to hold the king personally responsible for his public conduct would destroy
the independence necessary to govern, and also on the notion that the king governs for the
good of the people; therefore, he could do nothing to the prejudice of the people. Id.
50. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934). In discussing the United States
Constitution and the doctrine of sovereign immunity the Court stated:
[Tihere is no express provision that the United States may not be sued in the ab-
sence of consent. Clause 1 of section 2 of article 3 extends the judicial power 'to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party.'. . . But by reason of the
established doctrine of the immunity of the sovereign from suit except upon consent,
the provision of clause 1 of section 2 of article 3 does not authorize the maintenance
of suits against the United States.
Monaco, 292 U.S. at 321 (citation omitted).
51. WILLIAM B. WRIGHT, THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS AcT, ANALYZED AND ANNOTATED 1
(1957). The Federal Tort-Claims Act was passed by Congress in 1946 as Title IV of the
Legislative Reorganization Act. Id.
52. WRIGHT, cited at note 51, at 2. The private bill procedure eventually became cum-
bersome for Congress. During debate on the Legislative Reorganization Act, Congressman
Michner of Minnesota stated: "Congress is overburdened by many local and private matters
which divert its attention from national policy making .... It serves as a tribunal for the
settlement of private claims .... Title IV provides for the administrative and judicial ad-
justment of tort claims against the United States which Congress is poorly equipped to
settle." 92 Cong. Rec. 10,048 (1946).
53. WRIGHT, cited at note 51, at 5. The Federal Tort Claims Act provides for civil
actions against the United States for money damages, based on injury or loss of property, or
for personal injury or death caused by the negligence or wrongful act or omission of govern-
ment employees while acting within the scope of their employment. Id. The Act provides a
cause of action in circumstances where the United States, if it were a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place were the act or omission
occurred. Id. The Act's intent was not to create a new cause of action, but was simply to
make the United States liable in situations where a private party would be liable. Id.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(k) (1965). See note 6.
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v. Aetna Casualty.5 5 Aetna Casualty was a worker's compensation
case where the insurer brought suit against the United States
under the FTCA.5 6 The issue presented was whether an insurance
company could bring suit against the United States upon a subro-
gated claim.51 The issue required the United States Supreme Court
to decide whether the federal "Anti-Assignment" statute5 applied
to claims brought under the FTCA. e The Supreme Court decided
that the "Anti-Assignment" statute did not apply to claims
brought under the FTCA. 0 The Court rejected the government's
argument that the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity should be
narrowly construed. 1 The Court specifically established that the
breadth of the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity was not to be
construed solely upon the doctrine that holds that waivers of sov-
ereign immunity should be narrowly construed.2
Two years later, the United States Supreme Court again rejected
an opportunity to construe the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immu-
nity narrowly in United States v. Yellow Cab.63 Plaintiffs were tax-
icab passengers injured in a collision between the cab and a United
States mail truck. 4 The passengers sued Yellow Cab, the driver's
employer, and Yellow Cab impleaded the United States as a third-
party defendant.6 5 The United States moved for dismissal based on
the contention that suit was not authorized by the FTCA.66 The
55. 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
56. Aetna Casualty, 338 U.S. at 366.
57. Id. at 368.
58. Id. at 371-72. The Anti-Assignment statute essentially prohibits assignment of
claims against the United States except in certain limited circumstances. Id. The current
"Anti-Assignment" statute is 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1989), which states in relevant part: "an
assignment may be made only after a claim is allowed, the amount of the claim is decided,
and a warrant for payment of the claim has been issued." 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (1983).
59. Aetna Casualty, 338 U.S. at 370-72.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 383. The Court wrote:
In argument before a number of District Courts and Courts of Appeals, the Govern-
ment relied upon the doctrine 'that statutes waiving sovereign immunity must be
strictly construed. We think that the congressional attitude in passing the Federal
Tort Claims Act is more accurately reflected by Judge Cardozo's statement in Ander-
son v. John L. Hayes Constr. Co. (citation omitted): "The exemption of the sovereign
from suit involves hardship enough where consent has been withheld. We are not to
add to its rigor by refinement of construction where consent has been announced."
Id.
62. Id.
63. 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
64. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. at 544.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 544-45.
1993
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Supreme Court did not find this argument persuasive as it found
nothing in the language of the FTCA to support the government's
contention."e The Court characterized the FTCA's waiver of gov-
ernmental immunity as "sweeping", and once again rejected a nar-
row interpretation of the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.6 8
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the
FTCA's statute of limitations 9 in United States v. Kubrick.7 1 In
Kubrick, the respondent had been treated at a Veteran's Adminis-
tration hospital in 1968 for a leg infection and subsequently suf-
fered hearing loss; he filed suit under the FTCA in 1972.71 The
Supreme Court was faced with the issue of interpreting when a
"claim accrues" within the meaning of the FTCA 2 In its decision,
the Court declined to apply the statute of limitations to broaden
the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity.7s The Court concluded
that the statute of limitations began to run when the respondent
became aware of his injury in 1969, and held that the claim was
barred by the statute of limitations.7 '
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court, in Block v. Neal,
7
5
interpreted the FTCA's exception to its waiver of sovereign immu-
nity for "claims arising out of misrepresentation. '17 In this case
respondent obtained a loan from the Farmers Home Administra-
tion ("FHA") for the construction of a house.7 7 The contract re-
quired the construction to conform to FHA standards and required
67. Id. at 553.
68. Id. at 547.
69. Section 2401(b) provides: "[A] tort claim against the United States shall be for-
ever barred unless it is presented in writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two
years after such claim." 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1978 and Supp. 1993).
70. 444 U.S. 111 (1979).
71. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 113. Respondent was informed in January of 1969, by a
private physician, that his hearing loss was quite probably caused by his treatment with
antibiotics at the Veterans Administration hospital in 1968. Id. at 113-14. In June of 1971,
respondent was informed by another private physician that the treatment with antibiotics
probably caused his hearing loss, and that he should not have been administered antibiotics.
Id. at 114.
72. Id. at 116-17.
73. Id. at 117-18. The Court stated, "[w]e should also have in mind that the Act
waives the immunity of the United States and that in construing the statute of limitations,
which is a condition of that waiver, we should not take it upon ourselves to extend the
waiver beyond that which Congress intended. Id.
74. Id. at 122-23.
75. 460 U.S. 289 (1983).
76. Neal, 460 U.S. at 290. Section 2680(h) of the FTCA contains an exception to the
waiver of sovereign immunity for any claims arising out of misrepresentation. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2680(h) (1965 and Supp. 1993). See note 6 for complete text of this provision.
77. Neal, 460 U.S. at 291.
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the FHA to inspect the work.78 When respondent moved into the
house, she found a number of defects and filed suit against the
FHA under the FTCA for failure to properly inspect the house. 79
The issue facing the Court was whether respondent's complaint
was one arising out of misrepresentation, and therefore, barred by
the FTCA's exception for "claims arising out of misrepresenta-
tion."' 0 The Supreme Court interpreted the term "misrepresenta-
tion" narrowly and found that respondent's complaint was
grounded in negligence as well as misrepresentation and allowed
the claim.8 ' The Court cited Aetna Casualty" as support for its
narrow interpretation of an exception to the FTCA's waiver of sov-
ereign immunity.s
The only United States Supreme Court case prior to Smith v.
United States to interpret the foreign country exception to the
FTCA was United States v. Spelar.84 Respondent's decedent was
killed during takeoff from an airbase in Newfoundland which was
leased and operated by the United States Government.85 Respon-
dent brought a wrongful death action against the United States
under the FTCA. e In deciding Spelar, the Court relied on the lan-
guage and legislative history of the FTCA, as well as the Court's
prior interpretation of the term "foreign country. 87 Justice Reed
wrote for the majority in Spelar, and concluded that the language
of the FTCA alone was sufficient to define a foreign country as
territory subject to the sovereignty of another nation. 8 The Court
also cited earlier Supreme Court opinions that held a foreign coun-
78. Id.
79. Id. at 292.
80. Id. at 293-94.
81. Id. at 298-99.
82. 338 U.S. 366 (1949).
83. Neal, 460 U.S. at 298.
84. 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
85. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 218. Respondent's decedent was an employee of American
Overseas airlines and was killed in a plane crash while taking off at Harmon Field, New-
foundland. Id. at 218. The airbase was used by the United States pursuant to a ninety-nine
year lease between the United States government and the government of Great Britain. Id.
at 218-19.
86. Id. Respondent sued the United States under the FTCA, alleging that the death
of her decedent was caused by the United States' negligent operation of Harmon Field. Id.
The local law that grounded her action was the wrongful death statute of Newfoundland. Id.
The District Court found that the claim was one "arising in a foreign country" and dis-
missed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed
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try was defined as one within the sovereignty of a foreign nation. 9
The majority opinion in Spelar utilized the legislative history of
the FTCA as additional support for its position.90 The Supreme
Court relied primarily on discussions relating to proposed drafts of
the foreign country exception which were not adopted by Con-
gress.9' The Court interpreted this history as demonstrating an in-
tention on the part of Congress to avoid subjecting the government
of the United States to the laws of a foreign power.92 The Court
also noted that neither the language of the FTCA, nor the legisla-
tive history overcame the cannon of construction that holds that
United States statutes are normally only applicable within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the United States.9 While Spelar was the
only United States Supreme Court case prior to Smith v. United
States to interpret the foreign country exception, there have been
a number of federal circuit court of appeals cases that have con-
strued the FTCA's foreign country exception.
For example, Cobb v. United States9 presented the question of
the interpretation of the FTCA's foreign country exception in the
unusual setting of the United States as an occupying power in a
foreign land. 5 The claim in Cobb arose during the United States
89. Id. at 219 n.5. The Court cited De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 180 (1900),
wherein the Court quoted Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Story as defining a foreign
country as one "exclusively within the sovereignty of a foreign nation, and without the sov-
ereignty of the United States." Id. (citations omitted).
90. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 220-21.
91. Id. The Court discussed a 1942 draft considered by the House Committee on
Judiciary which exempted "all claims arising in a foreign country in behalf of an alien." Id.
at 220. The final version of the FTCA did not contain the phrase "in behalf of an alien." Id.
The Court quoted the following exchange between Assistant Attorney General Francis M.
Shea and Congressman Robsion of the House Committee on the Judiciary:
Mr. Shea ... Claims arising in a foreign country have been exempted from this bill,
H.R. 6463, whether or not the claimant is an alien. Since liability is to be determined
by the law of the situs of the wrongful act or omission it is wise to restrict the bill to
claims arising in this country. This seems desirable because the law of the particular
State is being applied. Otherwise, it will lead I think to a good deal of difficulty.
Mr. Robsion You mean by that any representative of the United States who commit-
ted a tort in England or some other country could not be reached under this?
Mr. Shea That is right. That would have to come to the Committee on Claims in
Congress.
Id. at 221 (quoting Draft of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 1942: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and
H.R. 6463 Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1942)).
The Court concluded that this quote supported the notion that the finally adopted coverage
of the Act was within the scope of the United States sovereignty. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 220-21.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 222.
94. 191 F.2d 604 (9th Cir. 1951).
95. Cobb, 191 F.2d at 605-06. Petitioner was employed by a contractor engaged in
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occupation of Okinawa after World War II116 Despite the United
States occupation of the island, the court determined it to be a
foreign country within the meaning of the FTCA, and dismissed
the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
e7
Another case involving the United States' use of foreign land
was Meredith v. United States,98 which concerned a tort claim
against the United States for acts that occurred within the physi-
cal confines of the American Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand.9 The
plaintiff argued that since Congress has the power to punish con-
duct occurring outside the physical territory of the United States,
the claim should not be barred by the FTCA's foreign country ex-
ception.100 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected this argu-
ment as being contrary to the holding of Spelar-.101 The court
noted that the tort law of Thailand would presumably be applica-
ble to the premises of the American Embassy and to subject the
United States to the laws of a foreign power would be contrary to
Congress' intent as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court in Spelar.
10 2
In 1984, the specific issue of whether the continent of Antarctica
is a "foreign country" within the meaning of the FTCA was ad-
dressed in the case of Beattie v. United States.10 3 In a lengthy
military construction on the Island of Okinawa, and was injured in an automobile accident
that was allegedly caused by the negligence of an employee of the United States. Id. at 605.
Petitioner brought suit under the FTCA for damages. Id.
The court noted that subsequent to the United States' conquest of Japan in World War
II, the only government in existence on Okinawa was the United States Military Govern-
ment. Id. at 606. The court discussed the issue of whether the United States or Japan held
sovereignty over the island and concluded that sovereignty was in a state of "solution." Id.
at 608. However, the court determined that since the United States had no power to alter
the tort law in effect on Okinawa, the tort law in effect was that of Japan, the last sovereign
of the island. Id. at 609. The court then followed Spelar, 338 U.S. at 217, and held that the
claim was barred by the FTCA's foreign country exception. Cobb, 191 F.2d at 609. The court
interpreted Spelar as holding that as long as the United States would be subject to the laws
of a foreign nation, the claim was barred under the FTCA's foreign country exception. Id.
96. Cobb, 191 F.2d at 605-06.
97. Id. at 611.
98. 330 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1964).
99. Meredith, 330 F.2d at 10.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 11. See notes 84-93 and accompanying text.
102. Meredith, 330 F.2d at 11.
103. 756 F.2d 91 (D.C. Cir. 1984). This case was a wrongful death action brought
against the United States under the FTCA for an airplane crash on the continent of Antarc-
tica. Beattie, 756 F. 2d at 93. The plaintiff alleged that the crash was caused by the negli-
gence of United States Navy air traffic controllers stationed in Antarctica, as well as negli-
gent acts on the.part of naval officers stationed in Washington, D.C. Id.
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opinion from which then Judge Scalia dissented, the Court of Ap-
peals, District of Columbia Circuit, concluded that Antarctica was
not a foreign country within the meaning of the FTCA. 04
To determine whether the FTCA was applicable to tort claims
arising in Antarctica, the majority opinion in Beattie divided the
question into three components: subject matter jurisdiction, venue,
and choice of law. 10 5 In addressing the question of subject matter
jurisdiction, the court followed the reasoning of Spelar to conclude
that the purpose of the FTCA's foreign country exception was to
avoid subjecting the United States government to the laws of other
countries.' The circuit court also examined the nature of Antarc-
tica, and the United States' treatment of Antarctica, to determine
whether the continent was a foreign country within the meaning of
the FTCA.1°7 The opinion also noted that a review of a broad
range of cases demonstrated that courts have consistently viewed
Antarctica as not being a foreign country for the purpose of apply-
ing a variety of statutes. 08 Having determined that Antarctica was
not a foreign country within the meaning of the FTCA, and there-
fore, that subject matter jurisdiction did exist, the court next ad-
dressed the question of whether the FTCA provided a venue for
tort claims arising in Antarctica."0 9
The court determined that the plaintiff's claim involved two
claims of negligence, one for acts arising in the United States, and
the other for acts arising in Antarctica.'1 Although the court de-




107. Id. at 93. The court analyzed the treatment of Antarctica by the United States
government and noted that through the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and subsequent state-
ments of government officials, the United States has consistently reaffirmed the position
that it does not recognize any territorial claims of sovereignty to Antarctica. Id. The opinion
stated simply "Antarctica is not a foreign country; it is not a country at all; it is not under
the domination of any other foreign nation or country." Id. at 94.
108. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 99. For example, the court noted that United States Tax
Court held in Larry R. Martin v. Commissioner, 50 T. C. 59 (1968), that Antarctica was not
a foreign country within the meaning of the income tax regulations. Id. at 98.
109. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 100.
110. Id. The plaintiff's suit was for wrongful death, alleging negligence on the part of
naval officers occurring in the Pentagon, as well as negligence of naval personnel stationed
in Antarctica. Id. The court viewed the plaintiff's suit as a single cause of action with two
separate grounds of relief, stating that the: "[p]laintiffs seek damages for an essentially sin-
gle wrong ... They allege against the same defendant two separate grounds for relief ...
Recognizing that there is but a single cause of action, venue under section 1402(b) is satis-
fied for the entire case by virtue of the headquarters claim." Id.
Vol. 32:167
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val headquarters, it elected to address the issue of whether venue
existed separately for the claim arising in Antarctica."' The court
noted that even if the Antarctic claim was sued on alone, the Dis-
trict Court of the District of Columbia might well be the most con-
venient forum since many of the witnesses would be in Washington
D.C." 2 The circuit court also was of the opinion that hearing the
Antarctic claim in the District of Columbia district court allowed
the court to comply with congressional intent and United States
Supreme Court precedent. "'
The Beattie court noted that past interpretations of the FTCA's
choice of law provision directed the district courts to apply the tort
law where the act or omission occurred."" The court was of the
opinion that the application of the choice of law provision to Ant-
arctica was not addressed by the statute because it directed the
court to adopt the law of a place where there is no civil law." 5
Thus, the court decided to treat the choice of law issue as one of
first impression." 6
To support the proposition that District of Columbia law could
be applied to a claim arising in Antarctica, the circuit court relied
on the principle of international law that allows a nation to exer-
cise jurisdiction over its nationals." 7 The court mentioned that the
District of Columbia held a strong interest in resolving the case,
and also pointed out that no foreign sovereignty had any compet-
ing interest in resolving the case."
8
The court characterized the government's argument as bifur-
cating the world into only two areas: foreign countries and the
United States." 9 The majority noted that there were obviously
other areas where people operate, such as the high seas, outer-
space, and Antarctica. 2" The court further noted that while the
other non-United States and non-foreign country areas were cov-
ered by some law, unless United States law covered the actions of
United States citizens in Antarctica, it would become a land with-
111. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 104.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id. The choice of law provision of the FTCA is section 1346(b). Id. See note 5 for
a complete text of this provision.
115. Id.
116. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 104.





out law. 2' Thus, the court concluded that United States law
should be applied to the claim arising in Antarctica. 22
In Beattie, Judge Scalia's dissent relied on the same FTCA
venue and choice of law clauses used in the majority opinion to
arrive at an opposite conclusion regarding subject matter jurisdic-
tion over claims arising in Antarctica. 2 3 Judge Scalia characterized
the majority's opinion as holding that the word "country" as used
in section 2680(k) of the FTCA meant "sovereign state", and if
Antarctica was not a sovereign state then the foreign country ex-
ception would not apply there. 2 " The dissent found little support
for this conclusion in the language of the FTCA.1
25
Judge Scalia asserted that if the majority's interpretation of the
term "foreign country" was correct, then the venue provision of the
FTCA would make no sense because there would be no judicial
district in which a suit for negligence arising in Antarctica could be
brought by a person residing outside the United States. 12 The dis-
senting opinion noted that courts normally assume that Congress
does not intend to create venue gaps, and by interpreting "foreign
country" to include Antarctica no such venue gap would exist.
27
Judge Scalia also viewed the FTCA's choice of law provision as
support for the argument that Congress intended the foreign coun-
try exception to include claims arising in Antarctica.'28 Judge
Scalia reasoned that since a literal reading of the choice of law pro-
vision would direct the court to apply the nonexistent law of Ant-
arctica, then the FTCA does not envision suits for torts occurring
in sovereignless regions.
29
121. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 105.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 105-130 (Scalia, J.. dissenting). Judge Scalia rejected the notion accepted
by the majority that the plaintiff's claim was one cause of action containing two claims, one
arising in Antarctica, the other arising in Washington D.C. Id. In Judge Scalia's view the
negligent acts or omissions took place in Antarctica; thus, the claim arose in Antarctica. Id.
124. Id. at 109.
125. Id. at 105-130.
126. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 110 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Section 1402(b) of the FTCA
provides for venue under the FTCA. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) (1976). See note 5.
127. Id. By "venue gap", Judge Scalia was referring to situations where a statute
would give a plaintiff a claim, but no venue in which to bring suit. Id. Judge Scalia also
asserted that it was unlikely that Congress would create a venue gap by oversight, as evi-
denced by the fact that Congress had specifically addressed possible venue gaps in other
legislation dealing with Antarctica. Id.
128. Id. at 111. Section 1346(b) of the FTCA contains the choice of law provision and
essentially directs the court to apply the law of the place where the act or omission oc-




The dissent of Judge Scalia dismissed the legislative history of
the FTCA and prior case law as unhelpful in deciding the question
of whether Antarctica was a foreign country within the meaning of
the FTCA."s0 The dissenting opinion observed that the FTCA was
formulated over a long period of time, and there was scant evi-
dence that some of the proposed amendments were ever seriously
considered by Congress.' Thus, Judge Scalia concluded that the
legislative history was of little use in resolving the question at is-
sue. 3 2 Likewise, Judge Scalia also perceived prior case law as offer-
ing little guidance because the FTCA foreign country exception
had never been interpreted in the factual setting of a claim arising
in Antarctica.' 3
In sum, the state of the case law prior to Smith v. United States
was that Antarctica was not considered a foreign country within
the meaning of the FTCA, as Beattie was the only opinion on the
matter. Although Judge Scalia's reasoning did not prevail in Beat-
tie, much of his reasoning is reflected in Justice Rehnquist's major-
ity opinion in Smith.'
In the final paragraph of the majority opinion in Smith, the
Court stated that its conclusion was the same one that the Sev-
enty-Ninth Congress would have reached, had it expressly consid-
ered whether Antarctica was within the scope of the FTCA. 36 The
statement is purely speculative, as the majority opinion offers little
to demonstrate how the Seventy-Ninth Congress may have felt
about Antarctica, or whether Congress even implicitly considered
the nature of Antarctic when adopting the FTCA. How the Sev-
enty-Ninth Congress would have decided the question in Smith re-
mains a complete unknown.
The FTCA was formulated over nearly a thirty year period and
was finally passed by Congress in 1946.136 Considering the level of
the United States involvement in Antarctica during this time pe-
130. Id. at 113-18.
131. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 113-18.
132. Id. at 115.
133. Id.
134. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1178.
135. Id. at 1183. The Court said:
We think these norms of statutory construction have quite likely led us to the same
conclusion that the 79th Congress would have reached had it expressly considered the
question we now decide: it would not have included a desolate and extraordinarily
dangerous land such as Antarctica within the scope of the FTCA.
Id.
136. WRIGHT, cited at note 51. at 5.
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riod, it is highly unlikely that Congress even gave a passing
thought to tort liability in Antarctica. The United States first in-
volvement in Antarctica was an 1840 expedition by the explorer,
Wilkes, who surveyed the coast but did not land.137 There was then
a gap of almost ninety years before any additional American activ-
ity concerning the continent occurred.138 During the period of 1928
to 1935, Admiral Byrd carried out two private expeditions on the
Ross Ice Shelf.13 e In 1939, Admiral Byrd launched an official
United States expedition that was intended to support a claim,
however, no such claim was made. 40 The first permanent settle-
ment by the United States was not established until 1957.4 This
scant level of American involvement with the continent strongly
suggests that the Seventy-Ninth Congress probably had no posi-
tion on tort claims arising in a land that did not even have perma-
nent settlements.
A review of the case law also indicates only one case where the
United States Supreme Court addressed Congress's motivation for
including the foreign country exception in the FTCA's waiver of
sovereign immunity. In Spelar, the Court relied upon the congres-
sional history of a never-adopted version of the FTCA to conclude
that the purpose of the FTCA's foreign country exception was to
avoid subjecting the United States to the laws of another nation.'
Judge Scalia's dissenting opinion in Beattie provides an accurate
description of the case law on the issue when he noted that it is
not possible to tell whether the courts addressing the issue were
concerned with the non-applicability of U.S. law or the applicabil-
ity of foreign law.'
43
Thus, while the Supreme Court in Smith addressed the issue of
prior case law and congressional intent, the decision really rested
on the language of the FTCA. The Court used the language of the
FTCA to support a narrow construction of the FTCA's waiver of
137. F. M. AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITICS 62 (1982).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 63-65.
141. Id.
142. Spelar, 338 U.S. at 220-21.
143. Beattie, 756 F.2d at 116 .(Scalia, J., dissenting). Judge Scalia stated:
There is in fact no way of telling whether the non-applicability of United States law
or the applicability of foreign law was crucial to the Court's thinking - and indeed it
seems highly unlikely that either the Spelar court or most other courts cited by the




Particularly illuminating of the fragile nature of the majority's
argument is the hypothetical applied by the Court to the FTCA's
venue and choice of law provisions. The majority noted that if
Antarctica is not a foreign country within the meaning of the
FTCA, then the possibility exists that a non-United States resi-
dent could have a claim but no venue in which to bring the suit.""
The Court then noted that in general Congress does not intend to
create venue gaps. ' 5 While the occurrence of this hypothetical sit-
uation is possible, it is not very likely that the Seventy-Ninth Con-
gress gave a thought to such a remote possibility when drafting the
FTCA. In sum, even the language of the FTCA offers little guid-
ance on the question of whether Antarctica should be considered a
foreign country for the purposes of the FTCA.
A review of United States Supreme Court decisions construing
the limits of the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity demon-
strates that the Court has, at different times, embraced both nar-
row and broad constructions of the FTCA's waiver of sovereign im-
munity. In Aetna Casualty' 6 , decided in 1949, Yellow Cab" ,
decided in 1951, and the 1983 case of Block v. Neal"5a, the Court
opted for a broad construction of the FTCA's waiver of sovereign
immunity. In the 1979 case of United States v. Kubrick"9 , the
Court narrowly construed the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immu-
nity. Therefore, in deciding Smith, the Court was faced with con-
flicting case law on how the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity
should be construed.
With no clear manifestation of congressional intent, nor a consis-
tent line of prior United States Supreme Court decisions for guid-
ance, the Court found itself faced with a policy decision. That the
Court opted for a narrow construction of the FTCA's waiver of
sovereign immunity is probably reflective of the current fiscal con-
dition of the United States Government as well as the philosophy
of the Court's members. The United States is currently several tril-
lion dollars in debt, and the national debt has become a prominent
public concern. The five most recently appointed Justices partici-
pating in the decision were nominated by Presidents that are con-
144. Smith, 113 S. Ct. at 1182.
145. Id.
146. Aetna Casualty, 338 U.S. at 383. See notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
147. Yellow Cab, 340 U.S. at 547. See notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
148. Neal, 460 U.S. at 298. See notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
149. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117, 118. See notes 70-74 and accompanying text.
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sidered conservatives.15 These factors were likely significant influ-
ences on the Court's decision to adopt a conservative approach to
exposing the United States Government to tort liability.
James C. Conley
150. COMMISSION ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION, THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS BEGINNINGS AND ITS JUSTICES, 1790-1991, 276
(1992). Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy were appointed by President Reagan, and
Justices Souter and Thomas were appointed by President Bush. Id.
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